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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HANOI 000634

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/ITA

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: [ASEC](#) [PTER](#) [VM](#) [CTERR](#)

SUBJECT: SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE
RESPONSES - VIETNAM

REF: STATE 28688

Responses are keyed to REFTEL and include input from
AmConGen Ho Chi Minh City.

1. (SBU) POLITICAL VIOLENCE - DEMONSTRATIONS

1A. NO
1B. YES
1C. YES
1D. :Following the initiation of hostilities in the Gulf,
there were small street demonstrations across from mission
facilities in both Hanoi and HCMC of about 100. In addition
there were also some large rallies (5,000 - 10,000),
organized by the government, that took place approximately
two blocks from the Consulate. Anti-war rallies of up to
10,000 were also reported in the provinces.

1E. Yes, both in reaction to U.S. Congressional criticism
of Vietnam and by U.S. Military action

1F. HANOI: Demonstrations have been generally peaceful.
However, a few bricks, rocks, and bottles were thrown at the
Embassy on a couple of occasions without physical damage and
much success of inciting violence

HCMC: Peaceful

1G. NO

1H. NO

1I. No, although there are periodic protests over land and
other issues, they are not anti-government.

1J. NO

1K. 100 people

1L. In 2003, we know of no violent demonstrations but in
earlier years some injuries have been reported

1M. N/A

2. POLITICAL VIOLENCE - MACRO CONFLICT CONDITIONS

2A. NO

2B. N/A

2C. N/A

2D. N/A

3. POLITICAL VIOLENCE - HOST COUNTRY CAPABILITIES

3A. NO

3B. Mission encourages participation in ILEA sponsored
courses. However, this program reaches a very limited
number of participants annually.

3C. YES

3D. SEE CLASSIFIED SEPTEL

3E. NO. The relationship is mostly unilateral, see
classified SEPTEL for additional information.

3F. N/A

3G. MIXED. In response to specific threat information in
September 2002, Embassy requested armed uniformed presence
at its facilities. The request was initially rejected, and
as a security measure the EAC closed the Embassy and ConGen
for several days. Following the closure the GVN relented
and began providing coverage for the Chancellery, Rose
Garden Annex and the EMR. This coverage remains to date.
More recently, the GVN provided additional officers at the
Embassy and Annex, and equipped them with AK-47 rifles, riot
helmets and flack vests. The Embassy was not advised in

advance of the increase in security. The rational eventually provided was that the increased security was for high profile diplomatic missions during the SEA Games. Shortly after the SEA Games ended, so did the additional coverage.

3H. POOR. While GVN security at major airports is insufficient (below average-poor), the CAAV shows continuing interest in cooperating with the USG on safety and the aspects of security that remain under their purview. Embassy has not conducted an in-depth assessment, but as part of the implementation of the recently approved Air Transport Agreement, the CAAV is receiving USG assistance with safety and security reviews and training in preparation for assessments from the ICAO.

3I. Average. Can be effective if they want to be, but riddled with corruption, hampered by lack of equipment, especially beyond the two major international airports in Hanoi and HCMC

3J. Poor

4. INDIGENOUS TERRORISM - ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS

4A. NO

4B. N/A

4C. N/A

4D. N/A

4E. N/A

4F. N/A

4G. N/A

4H. N/A

5. INDIGENOUS TERRORISM - OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS

5A. NO. The GVN claims that there are, but the USG does not consider these groups to be terrorists. These are usually groups of Ex-Pat Vietnamese, living in other countries, who criticize or even oppose the SRV.

5B. N/A

5C. N/A

5D. N/A

5E. N/A

6. TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM - TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST INDICATORS

6A. Not that Mission is aware of.

6B. N/A

6C. NO

6D. Not that Mission is aware of.

6E. N/A

6F. SEE CLASSIFIED SEPTTEL

6G. The border is very porous and there is smuggling of small arms and relatively small amounts of explosives. The explosives are generally intended for commercial use. However, the items would be available for purchase if a terrorist cell needed them. Explosives have also been used recently, predominately in the south, as a method of carrying out vendettas.

BURGHARDT